Space Security & Sovereignty

How should satellites be treated alongside undersea cables and terrestrial networks as national critical infrastructure? What should resilience look like when one layer is attacked or fails?

How is the threat landscape changing, from physical threats in orbit to cyber intrusions targeting ground stations and communications links? What responsibilities does this create for commercial operators?

What baseline cybersecurity requirements should apply to satellite operators, particularly small satellites and IoT constellations? Who should establish, verify, and enforce those requirements?

How can regulators and industry ensure that assets remaining in orbit for years stay secure and upgradable as threats evolve? This opens a joint discussion on policy safeguards and SEALSQ’s approach to cryptographic protection and migration.

Drawing on Jessica Rosenworcel’s FCC experience addressing untrusted vendors, how should governments and companies assess trust across satellite hardware, software, ground infrastructure, and service providers?

How can countries retain control over critical connectivity, data, and encryption keys when infrastructure is concentrated among a small number of providers? Could a hybrid public-private sovereign constellation offer a practical model, while supporting cooperation with allies?

As devices connect directly from orbit, who controls and secures those links? How should national oversight evolve when connectivity extends beyond terrestrial networks?

How should national interests and equitable access be balanced with global coordination as competition for spectrum and orbital resources intensifies? What priorities should shape preparations for WRC-27 and discussions at the ITU in Geneva?

What lessons can be drawn from the FCC’s five-year deorbit rule? How should debris mitigation and responsible behavior in orbit become part of infrastructure resilience and security planning?